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ECONOMIC TERROR: MARKET MANIFESTATIONS 
OF TERROR ATTACKS
RICHARD V. RODRIGUEZ*
In the recent past, we have paid painful witness to terrorism’s capacity to harm the United States 
fi nancial sector.  While the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and at-
tempt on the Pentagon (9/11) are perhaps most commonly viewed as unprecedented physical terror 
attacks, they also exemplify an economic attack.1 Besides the immeasurable value of  lives lost in the 
attack, there were also grave fi nancial costs. The price of  terrorism is something that is becoming 
more of  an issue in a largely connected fi nancial market. Where once, we worried about fi nance be-
ing used to support terrorism, there is now a clearer concern about the fi nancial impact of  terrorist 
attacks. The question is: if  terrorists have noticed this, could they use this information to “double-
down” on the damage they cause?
A. FINANCING OF TERROR
The direct property damages of  9/11 are estimated at over $20 billion.2 The abstract cost, or 
opportunity cost, is estimated at around $1.7 billion for September alone in the U.S. Exchanges and a 
2.7% drop in the world’s economic growth rate.3 The stock market itself  did not open on 9/11, nor 
did it do so for an entire week thereafter. The World Trade Center had communication and transac-
tional systems that the markets needed. The markets, though, were not closed simply because of  the 
physical destruction of  systems, but they were also affected by the destruction of  confi dence in the 
market itself. This issue was not just one that only affected the U.S. Instead, the 9/11 attacks rippled 
*     Richard Victor Rodriguez is a JD/MBA candidate at American University – Washington College of  Law.  He 
previously earned both his Master of  Human Capital Management and Bachelor of  Business Management, focusing 
in Finance, from the State University of  New York at Stony Brook.  He has extensive experience in both the retail and 
commercial banking fi elds and his studies currently focus on Banking, Securities, and the Capital Markets.  
1  See Paul Krugman, The Costs of  Terrorism: What Do We Know? 2, 1–2, 4–6 (Dec. 13, 2004) (unpublished 
manuscript, available online), http://www.l20.org/libraryitem.php?libraryId=9 (describing economic costs as being 
comprised of  “direct economic damage” to buildings, infrastructure, and lives; the additional spending by the 
government to fi ght terrorism; and the cost of  businesses, government, and individuals choosing economically safer but 
less productive activities or plans than they otherwise would have).  
2  See Krugman, at 2. 
3   See Dick K. Nanto, 9/11 Terrorism: Global Economic Costs, CRS Report for Congress, 3 (October 5, 2004) (asserting 
the opportunity cost without including the $53 billion the U.S. spent on combating terrorism which can also be 
considered an opportunity cost); cf. Krugman, supra note 1, at 6 (“[There is a] net cost to the world economy [when] 
people and businesses whose decisions are affected by terrorism choose alternatives that would otherwise be regarded as 
less desirable . . . . [W]hen a tourist decides to hear country music in Branson rather than [go to Broadway,] the cost to 
the U.S. economy is the extra he or she would have been willing to pay to see the metropolitan production.”)
130 NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF Vol. 1, No. 1
internationally, impacting the confi dence of  investors in world markets.4 Fortunately, the market 
recovered fairly quickly.5 But the aftereffects stayed within the markets.6
Under the Bush Administration, the United States took decisive steps to prevent this from 
happening again. Banks and citizens saw business practices change, as the USA Patriot Act curbed 
the use of  fi nancial markets and instruments to proliferate terrorism.7 Title III of  the Patriot Act 
specifi cally sought to curb money laundering by terrorist organizations.8 The 9/11 terrorist group 
spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 on their vicious plot and fi nanced operations by 
“us[ing] the anonymity provided by the huge international and domestic fi nancial system to move 
and store their money through a series of  unremarkable transactions.” 9 The bulk of  the U.S. Depart-
ment of  Homeland Security’s (DHS) focus has been, in the past few years, to curb such terrorist 
funding by using existing policy and legal tools. This has been of  extreme importance as the 9/11 
plot only took $500,000 of  the annual budget of  Al Qaeda, which had previously been estimated at 
$30 million.10 Stopping these funding mechanisms, however, has proven a diffi cult task. 
Terrorist fi nancing, although compared to money laundering, is actually a unique fi nancial crime. 
Money laundering involves dirty money11 being “cleaned” or fi nding a way to legally route it through 
the fi nancial system without detection. Terrorist fi nancing though, often involves the use of  clean 
money for lethal purposes. 12 While some terrorist funding sources do rely on traditional criminal 
activities, such as extortion, narcotics traffi cking, or counterfeiting, others rely on more modern and 
legitimate models. These include donations or funds skimmed from donations, commercial enter-
prises, and even state-sponsored funding. The Department of  the Treasury’s Financial Crimes En-
4  Amy Zalman, Economic Impact of  Terrorism and the September 11 Attacks:  Direct Economic Impact Was Less Than Feared, 
But Defense Spending Rose by 1/3, ABOUT.COM, http://terrorism.about.com/od/issuestrends/a/ EconomicImpact.htm (last 
visited Sept. 3, 2010).
5  See R. BARRY JOHNSTON & OANA M. NEDELESCU, “THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM ON FINANCIAL MARKETS” 7(International 
Monetary Fund) (2005) (“[O]nce the initial shock passed, both markets [measured by the S&P 500 and the Dow 
Jones EURO STOXX Index] bounced back within weeks to pre-September 11 levels and generally continued to rise 
thereafter”).
6  Cf. Krugman supra note 1, 6 (arguing that distortion costs resulted from travelers changing plans due to heightened 
fear of  a terrorist attack); see also Nanto supra note 3, 2 (stating that 279,000 travel and tourism jobs were lost after the 
9/11 attacks).
7  See International Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-Terrorism Act of  2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 
301, 115 Stat. 272, 295-297 (codifi ed at 31 U.S.C. 5301, 31 U.S.C. 5311, and under various other titles and sections).
8  § 302(b)(1).
9  See NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, MONOGRAPH ON TERRORIST FINANCING, app. 
A, at 131, 133-139, available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/staff_statements/911_TerrFin_Monograph.pdf  
[hereinafter MONOGRAPH] (listing the different forms the currency went through: wires, traveler’s checks, and overseas 
accounts through American and foreign bank correspondent accounts, although no American was found by the report 
to have assisted in any of  these dealings).
10  Id. at 144 (estimating the budget of  Al Qaeda during the period of  the 9/11 plot at $30 million).
11  Dirty money is normally used as proceeds from criminal activity as differentiated from terrorist fi nancing which 
usually involves the reverse:  using clean funds for “dirty” purposes.  
12  Terrorism:  Growing Wahhabi Infl uence in the United States:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. __ 
(2003) (testimony of  David Aufhauser, General Counsel, U.S. Treasury Dep’t), available at  http://www.au.af.mil/au/
awc/awcgate/congress/terrorist_fi nancing.htm [hereinafter AUFHAUSER].  
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forcement Network (FinCEN), the FBI’s Financial Crimes Section (FCS), the Department of  State, 
the Department of  Justice, and other Federal agencies have been using both their own tools and 
the powers conferred by the Patriot Act to create more transparency and accountability in fi nancial 
institutions around the world. Indeed, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an intergovernmen-
tal body established by the G7 in 1989, is co-chaired by the U.S. Treasury and has worked toward 
setting specifi c global transactions tracking standards, as one way to make sure terrorists do not take 
advantage of  fractured regulatory environments.  For instance, subsidiaries held by international 
bank holding companies, like Citibank or Bank of  America, were identifi ed as potential targets for 
such abuses.13 These agencies have also taken steps to shut down hawalas,14 which were heavily used 
for short-term and “anonymous” fi nancing.15 Some organizations who offered these services were 
reclassifi ed by law as MSBs,16 which now subjected them to money laundering and terrorist fi nancing 
regulations.
How have these operations succeeded thus far? In a three-year span (2001-2003), 281 persons 
or entities were designated as terrorist organizations or as entities supporting terrorism; through 
broad international cooperation, assets of  over $137 million belonging to these groups were fro-
zen.17 While this does seem to be a large amount, Al Qaeda paid the Taliban $20 million a year, in 
tithe alone, for safe harbor within Afghanistan.18 The Taliban, who tax opium producers, are rumored 
to have stockpiled more than 10,000 tons of  poppy seeds (used to manufacture opium and heroin) 
themselves; this amounts to a street value of  billions of  U.S. dollars.  Such a fi gure calls into ques-
tion any “accomplishment” in freezing a mere $137 million.19 Thus terrorist funding is still a major 
issue. Case in point: the U.S. Treasury Department stated that it was overwhelmed by the amount of  
13  See MONOGRAPH, supra note 9, app. A, at 134–135, 138–140 (identifying Citibank and Bank of  America as the prime 
international banks used by the 9/11 terrorists).
14  See  U.S. Dep’t of  the Treasury, Key Issues:  Hawala & Alternative Remittance Systems, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
http://www.ustreas.gov/offi ces/enforcement/key-issues/hawala/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2010) (defi ning hawala as “a fast 
and cost-effective method for the worldwide remittance of  money or value, particularly for persons who may be outside 
the reach of  the traditional fi nancial sector”); see also AUFHAUSER, supra note 8 (using the same defi nition).
15  But cf. MONOGRAPH, supra note X, at 139 (“[there] is no evidence to suggest that the hijackers used hawala . . . to 
send money to the United States [for the 9/11 attacks]”).  
16  See IRS, Money Services Business (MSB) Information Center, IRS.GOV, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/
article/0,,id=185491,00.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2010) (defi ning money service businesses (MSBs) those businesses 
that offer “check cashing, money orders, traveler’s checks, money transfers, currency dealing or exchange, and stored 
value products” and stating that they are subject to certain Bank Secrecy Act requirements).  These requirements include 
the following: Registering with the federal government.  Reporting cash transactions of  more than $10,000.  Reporting 
suspicious activity.  And having an anti-money laundering compliance program.  See id.; see also AUFHAUSER, supra note 8 
(noting that over 14,000 money service businesses had already complied with registration by 2003).
17  See AUFHAUSER, supra note 8.
18  Id.  
19  Simon Wilson, Where Do al-Qaeda and the Taliban Get Their Money?, MONEY WEEK, Oct. 23, 2009, http://www.
moneyweek.com/news-and-charts/economics/where-al-qaeda-and-the-taliban-get-their-money-45809.aspx (pointing 
out that even if  foreign fi nancing were cut off, taxes on stockpiled drugs could be a long-term source of  fi nancing).  But 
see id. (admitting that the while the Taliban is estimated to make $70-100 million a year from taxing drugs, it also received 
$106 million in foreign donations in 2009).
132 NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF Vol. 1, No. 1
suspicious activity reports received in 2001 alone—when reports rose 350%.20 If  governments are 
having problems with the enforcement of  current laws and have only managed to freeze a fraction 
of  targeted assets, where does the U.S. stand in relation to accomplishing its goals of  stopping the 
funding of  terrorism?
The terrorist fi nance networks themselves branch out through other networks in multiple na-
tions.  To deal with these networks within its own borders, the U.S. government needs to improve 
coordination between the private and public sectors. Thus, unlike the U.K. system where U.K. banks 
spend $430 million per year on anti-terror and anti-money laundering measures alone, an American 
system should be implemented that uses the resources jointly and more effi ciently.  This would light-
en the impact upon the private sector, and government agencies would be less overwhelmed. This 
same model would apply to the U.S. government when it works in conjunction with other States, 
which themselves have weaker banking regulatory systems susceptible to exploitation by terrorist 
groups. Again, a clear model needs to be established within U.S. borders, before the U.S. begins to 
coordinate enforcement efforts globally. As the U.S looks to harmonize enforcement work of  its dif-
ferent agencies, some major priorities include: (1) setting issue-based parameters for the jurisdiction 
of  each agency, (2) whether to freeze individual assets or network assets, and (3) devoting attention 
not only to inter-agency matters, but also to public and private harmonization in the fi ght against 
terrorist funding.
B. MONEY FOR “FINANCIAL TERROR” INSTEAD OF FUNDING TERROR
The 9/11 Commission investigated the role of  trading in the time leading up to 9/11, to see if  
any transactions were strategically placed in anticipation of  a potential market reaction to the attacks. 
The Commission particularly scrutinized the use of  shorts, options, and various other derivatives, 
such as insurance contracts. They found that no investments had been made in anticipation or with 
knowledge of  the attacks. Many people had been clamoring over the possibility that terrorists were 
“doubling-down” on their attacks by trading on markets in the knowledge that that their attacks 
would create market change in a predictable pattern.21 Still, even thought the Commission concluded 
there was no evidence, one must remember the words of  astronomer Carl Sagan that “absence of  
evidence is not [the] evidence of  absence.”22
While federal investigators did not fi nd any evidence of  suspect patterns in fi nancial markets, 
they were considering the possibility that terrorist groups were manipulating securities markets to 
fund their operations. In 2007, the U.S. Treasury, jointly with the DHS, created a Banking and Fi-
20  See Eben Kaplan, Tracking Down Terrorist Financing, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Apr. 4, 2006,  http://www.cfr.
org/publication/10356/tracking_down_terrorist_fi nancing.html.
21   See Profi ting from Disaster:  When the Stocks Fell, $5 Million Profi t Was Made, CBS EVENING NEWS, Sept. 19, 2001, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/09/19/eveningnews/main311834.shtml; David Musser, World Trade Center 
Terrorist Profi teering:  Largest Terrorist Financial Attack in American History, SUITE101.COM, Mar. 7, 2010, http://www.suite101.
com/content/world-trade-center-terrorist-profi teering-a210334.  
22  Dr. Carl Sagan Quotes, THINKEXIST.COM, http://thinkexist.com/quotation/absence_of_evidence_is_not_evidence_
of_absence/154055.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2010).
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nance Sector Strategy plan to identify key infrastructural points within the fi nancial system in order 
to prioritize and coordinate protection among various federal agencies and private sector entities.23 
In February of  2007, India’s national security advisor reported that a Sri Lanka-based terrorist 
organization had set up shell companies to raise funds through Indian securities markets.24 The CIA 
has briefed other U.S. agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on organiza-
tions that have been increasingly active in foreign securities markets. While the SEC has already un-
dertaken a large burden regulating its domain within the domestic market, it is now being briefed on 
international terrorist fi nancing through securities markets over which it has no jurisdiction. While 
the Patriot Act and FinCEN regulation require U.S. securities fi rms to follow anti-money laundering 
laws, the system’s fragmented nature (distributed among brokers and dealers) could allow for some 
less-than-honest persons and entities to look the other way on transactions without realizing that 
they are inadvertently aiding terrorist fundraising. This vulnerability is due in no small part to the 
incentive-based commission process of  the securities industry. 
As the current economic climate has reminded us, regulators tend to lag behind the private sec-
tor, because the marketplace can improve its products and mechanisms at a much faster rate.25 The 
IMF has conducted a study showing that the fi nancial markets can be victim, perpetrator, or instru-
mentality in a terrorist attack.26 The study found that in 1998, terrorist targets started to change from 
military to civilian targets.27 Businesses as targets have, in fact, been favored by terrorists as well. 
While many businesses have not seen market effects as strong as some experts have warned, some 
scholars have argued that were it not for the Federal Reserve’s “accommodative policy,” the effects 
of  9/11 would have been even more devastating.28 The study goes on to indicate that on a macro-
level, a fi nancial industry with diversifi ed portfolios, regardless of  natural or non-natural infl uences 
can create a safer system; however, at the micro-level, direct attacks on fi nancial markets will still 
affect the markets and this underlines the importance of  having a contingency plan in place.29
While terrorist groups have yet to directly attack the fi nancial and securities markets, a coor-
23  See generally DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY  & U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, BANKING AND FINANCE: CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE AND KEY RESOURCES SECTOR SPECIFIC PLAN AS INPUT TO THE NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 
PLAN 1 (2007), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp-ssp-banking.pdf. 
24  See M. K. Narayanan, India Nat’l Sec. Adviser, Speech at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy (Feb. 11, 
2007).
25  Cf. The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of  2000:  Hearing on S. 2697 Before the S. Comm. on Agric., Nutrition & 
Forestry and the Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of  Arthur Levitt, Chairman, U.S. 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n) (stating that for the SEC to assert jurisdiction over products or instruments, it needs to meet, 
usually time-tested, criteria that show these products or instruments are under the SEC’s jurisdiction).
26  See generally Johnston & Nedelescu, supra note 5, at 3(arguing that banks can be harmed directly or indirectly; used 
to set up and support terrorism; and used, without knowledge, to channel terrorist funds).
27  See Johnston & Nedelescu, supra note 5, at 3. See generally Tilman Brück & Bengt-Arne Wickström, The Economic 
Consequences of  Terror: Guest Editors’ Introduction, 20 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 293-300 (2004);
28  Id. at 7–8 (citing Andrew H. Chen & Thomas F. Siems, The Effects of  Terrorism on Global Capital Markets, 20 EURO. J. 
POL. ECON 349–366 (2004).
29  Id at 8–9.
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dinated attack with the use of  large amounts of  money being strategically placed30 would not be 
altogether without precedent. Financial markets have been “infl uenced” by large movements of  
money as well as threats of  large movements of  money. Take, for example, the Suez Canal Crisis 
in 1956.31 When Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal and drove 
British, French, and Israeli troops to the verge of  war with Egypt, the United States dissuaded the 
British government by threatening to sell a commodity. What was the commodity? British pounds. A 
sell-off  of  U.S.-held debt would have led to a crash in the British markets due to the massive depre-
ciation of  the pound. Pressured by this economic threat and the U.N.’s condemnation of  a war, the 
Suez Canal Crisis was eventually settled peacefully. 
Moving forward sixteen years to 1972 and the Nixon Administration-backed fall of  the Allende 
government, one may see another form of  such pressure.32 Nixon exerted fi nancial pressure against 
the Allende government by restricting international economic credit to Chile. This exacerbated a 
pre-existing problem, as Allende’s currency policy for fi nancing certain domestic projects had caused 
commercial banks to downgrade Chile’s credit ratings.33 In the current century, one may consider 
more the recent examples from 2006, 2009, and 2010 of  the Chinese government exerting their 
fi nancial muscle against the United States. In 2006, it became an attractive political talking point to 
decry the loss of  negotiating leverage due to the indebtedness of  the United States to China.34 In 
2009, after Bush’s “TARP I” and Obama’s “TARP II”  stimulus programs, which created very fl at 
yields on U.S. GDP and a higher defi cit, China publicly expressed concern about its investment in 
U.S. government debt. In 2010, when the U.S. sold weapons to Taiwan, Chinese military offi cials 
proposed boosting defense spending and selling U.S. bonds to punish Washington.35
These examples of  pressure brought by State actors arguably border on fi nancial “terror” when 
used on other State actors. Take the private sector into consideration: credit default swap (CDS) 
30  This can be either through a conventional attack and strategic “short” selling on assets that would be affected by an 
attack or strategic movements of  money utilized as the main terrorist “attack”.
31  While terrorism is typically (if  not always) a non-State act; a non-State actor could effectually do more ambitious 
projects either in conjunction with a terrorist-supporting State or with enough fi nancial support and/or resources.
32  See STAFF OF S. SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, 
94TH CONG.,  COVERT ACTION IN CHILE 1963-1973, at 26-38 (Comm. Print 1975), available at http://www.fas.org/
irp/ops/policy/church-chile.htm (describing economic pressures placed on the Allende government by the Nixon 
Administration).  
33  Id.
34  See, e.g., Teddy Davis, Debt Weakens U.S. Hand on China:  Democratic Sen. Evan Bayh Sounds Alarm on Debt and 
Dependency, April 20, 2006, ABC NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/International/story?id=1867118&page=1 
(reporting that Democratic Senator Bayh was among those stating that the U.S. must pay close attention to its debt 
dependency with China).
35  Chris Buckley, China PLA Offi cers Urge Economic Punch Against U.S., REUTERS, Feb. 9, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/
article/idUSTRE6183KG20100209 (noting, however, that the “People’s Liberation Army . . . plays no role in setting 
policy for China’s foreign exchange holdings” and that such a “move could alarm markets and damage the value of  
China’s own holdings.”).
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contracts sold by AIG brought AIG down in 2008.36 Most of  the CDS contracts sold to banks were 
sold by the very investment banks that had created the underlying assets. As many of  these underly-
ing assets began to fail, AIG could not refi nance its debt, as its credit ratings were downgraded due 
to declining liquidity from the CDS payouts. While there was technically no foul play, this company 
was brought down because of  these CDS contracts. The same could have been done by a fund with 
enough money. If  enough CDS contracts were bought against a company, its credit ratings would 
be brought down; this, in turn, would make it harder for a fi rm to refi nance its debt and create new 
liquidity. When a company goes illiquid, it goes bankrupt and the CDS contracts earn money.37
A terrorist organization with the backing of  deep-pockets or a State actor wanting to attack the 
U.S. fi nancial markets, perhaps as a reprisal against disagreeable U.S. policies, could follow a similar 
approach. By selling CDS contracts on an entity, it starts the cyclical time clock of  a company’s 
downfall, if  enough contracts are sold on the said company. This idea is very similar to short-selling 
a company when a panic occurs in the market. While this type of  pressure has not been executed by 
a government, let alone by a non-state actor, it presents a dangerous possibility for vulnerable fi nan-
cial markets. The DOJ, the Treasury Department, the SEC, and the DHS have already begun recruit-
ing and creating offi ces specializing in the intersection of  fi nance and counterterrorism.38 What has 
yet to be carried out, but should be sanctioned, is a multi-agency study to explore the likelihood, 
timeline, and potential actors involved in carrying out such acts through complex fi nancial instru-
ments. 
For this reason, fi nancial terrorism and the funding of  fi nancial terrorism have not only become 
intrinsically linked issues but they could be a complement to future attacks: whether a non-State 
actor works with a State-actor, whether a traditional terrorist attack is “doubled-down” by strategi-
cally placed fi nancial derivatives, or whether the attack is a complex fi nancial attack implemented 
through the simple positioning of  mass fi nancial resources. With the interconnectedness of  world 
36  See generally Kenneth Vereen, Jr., How Credit Default Swaps Brought Down Wall Street, 2 GATTON STUDENT RES. 
PUBLICATION 1, 1-16. (Spring 2010), available at http://gatton.uky.edu/GSRP/Downloads/Issues/Spring2010/How%20
Credit%20Default%20Swaps%20Brought%20Down%20Wall%20Street.pdf.  CDS or credit default swaps are basically 
insurance contracts on debts. They work almost like short-selling on a company, except for the fact that they are separate 
insurance contracts based on an underlying obligation by the fi rm. The buyer of  a CDS does not have to be in privity 
with the debt obligator.
37  When short-term or long-term fi nancing becomes too expensive to fund a company’s operational costs, the 
company will need to fi le bankruptcy when they have no cash on hand to cover present expenses.
38  See Biometric Identifi cation:  Before the H. Appropriations Comm., Subcomm. on Homeland Sec., 101th Cong. (2009) 
(statements of  Kathleen Kraninger, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Policy, Screening Coordination & Robert A. Mocny, 
Director, US-VISIT, Nat’l Prot. & Programs Directorate), available at http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/
testimony_1237563811984.shtm; see also DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TREASURY FORFEITURE FUND:  ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 1 
(2003), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offi ces/enforcement/teoaf/publications/03-annual-report.pdf  (updating the 
inter-operation work of  the fund to coordinate the multi-task operation with the new DHS agency involvement with the 
2002 Homeland Security Act); Dep’t of  Justice, President Obama Establishes Interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Nov. 17, 2009, available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/November/09-opa-1243.html 
(establishing a Financial Fraud Task force consisting of  senior-level offi cials from the Department of  the Treasury, the 
Department of  Justice, the Department of  Housing and Urban Development, the Securities Exchange of  Commission, 
and other agencies).
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markets, an attack on the United States would not even have to be directed at U.S. markets to have 
a profound effect.  Imagine the possibility of  a knowledgeable Iran taking a negative position on a 
company that is about to be a target of  a conventional terrorist attack by Hezbollah; or the Chinese 
government, for example, selling of  U.S. debt in an uncontrolled manner in a illegitimate fashion to 
hurt the U.S. economy.39 U.S. agencies need to renew focus on terrorists manipulating the fi nancial 
system in order to calculate the danger and study which law and regulations are in place to deter 
such manipulation. The United States has long had the executive power of  declaring “bank holi-
days” to stop panics, but is that enough?  An even more important question is: what other measures 
could the U.S. take? The Treasury has multiple agencies dealing in the fi nancial fi eld; how are these 
and other agencies at the SEC, DOJ, and HUD coordinated by the DHS? These issues need to be 
answered from an ex ante, rather than ex post, perspective.  
39  While a Chinese attempt to sell a substantial amount of  U.S. debt would impact the U.S., it would also likely hurt 
the Chinese.  Such a maneuver would harm the China’s position among countries friendly to the U.S., and China would 
not likely recoup their heavy investments in full. 
